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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN F. RUSSELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GRANT L. V ALEN'TINE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9648 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 'OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the lessor, plaintiff, against 
defendant, lessee, to determine if a lease termin-
ated, because the renewal provision of the lease was 
void for indefiniteness, vagueness and uncertainty. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court, sitting with-
out a jury. Judgment was entered for the pl1aintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks reversal of the Judgment, 
and Judgment in favor of the defendant as a mat-
ter of law, that the lease has not terminated, and 
was renewed for ten years. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Edwin F. Russell, the owner of 
real property located in Roy, Weber County, Utah, 
entered into a lease on the 29th day of May, 1950, 
as lessor, with Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., of 
Salt Lake City, lessee. The lease "\Vas for a period 
of ten years, commencing the first day of June, 
1950. The lease contained a provision, Paragraph 
8, providing for renewal of the lease (Exhibit 1). 
Grant L. Valentine, the defendant, is the as-
signee of the lease, through successive assignments, 
and occupied the premises as assignee of the lease 
from the 30th day of October, 1954 (Exhibit 4). 
The renewal provision of the lease required the 
lessee to give the lessor notice in writing, thirty days 
prior to the expiration of the lease that he desired 
renewal of the same. Grant L. Valentine, on April 
29, 1960, gave written notice to Edwin F. Russell 
of his desire to renew the lease, pursuant to the 
provisions of Paragraph 8 of said lease, and in all 
particulars complied with the requirements of the 
lease, as to notice of renewal (Exhibit 8) . 
The plaintiff filed this action to have the court 
declare the lease terminated, contending that the 
renewal clause was vague, ambiguous, indefinite 
and uncertain ( R. 2) . The lease was prepared by 
the attorney for the original lessee, Mr. C. N. Otto-
sen, of Salt Lake City (T. 5). The trial judge's 
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Finding of Fact, Paragraph 8, states the provisions 
of Paragraph 8 referring to renewal were ambig-
uous, indefinite and uncertain, and incapable of 
enforcement (R. 22). The court found that the lease 
terminated a:t the end of the ten year period, and 
could not be renewed because of the ambiguity, in-
defitenesiS 'and uncertainty of the renewal clause 
( R. 2·2). 'The court held, as a Conclusion of Law, 
(R. 23), and entered Judgment that the lease term-
inated the 31st day of May, 1960 (R. 25). 
The paragraph of the lease, which is the sub-
ject of this lawsuit, defendant's Exhibit 1, provides: 
"8. If the Lessee shall keep, observe and 
perform all of the terms 'and conditions of 
this lease, on his part to be kept and perform-
ed, said Lessee shall have the right to renew 
this lease for a further period beginning as 
of the termination date of this lease, provided 
he shall notify the Lessor in writing thirty 
days prior to the terms of this agreement that 
he desires such renewal and provided, further, 
that he shall sign or offer to sign a new lease 
upon the same terms and conditions as are 
herein contained.'' 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE, 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 1, REFERRING TO RENEW-
AL THEREOF, WERE AMBIGUOUS, INDEFINITE 
AND UNCERTAIN AND INCAPABLE OF ENFORCE-
MEN'T. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PAROL 
TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET THE 
TERMS OF THE WRTTTEN LEASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE, 
DE'FENDANT'S EXHIBIT 1, RE'FERRING TO RENEW-
AL THEREOF, WERE AMBIGUOUS, INDEFINITE 
AND UNCERTAIN AND INCAPABLE OF ENFORCE-
MEN'T. 
I't is the contention of the defendant that Para-
graph 8 of the lease, cited above, is clear 'and un-
ambiguous and the intention of the parties was 
clearly expressed. It provided for a renewal of the 
lea:se, which was to commence on the termination 
date of the original lease; that is, M'a,y 31, 1960. 
The only uncertainty claimed in the paragraph is 
the phrase granting a renewal "for a further 
period". Any claimed uncertainty disappears when 
the phrase is analyzed and the rules of construc-
tion as apply to renewal leruse provisions are con-
sidered: 
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"As a general rule, in construing provisions 
relating to renewals, where there is any un-
certainty, the tenant is favored and not the 
landlord, because the latter, having the power 
of stipul'ating in his own favor, has neglected 
to do so, and also upon the principle that every 
man's grant is to be taken strongly agains1t 
himself." 32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant, 
Section 962, P. 807. 
Typical of the numerous cases cited in favor 
of this proposition is Hughes Realty Company vs. 
Breitbach, 98 N.W. 2d. 374 (N.D.), There the court 
in discussing the uncertainty which existed in the 
1·enewal provision of a lease, stated: 
" ... In construing the provisions in the lease 
before the court relative to the option to re-
new any uncertainty in the language of the 
option must be construed in favor of the ten-
ant and against the lessor. The lessor had the 
power to incorporate terms and conditions 
in his own favor, and if he neglected to do so, 
he alone i1s responsible." 
See also Streicher vs. H eimburg, 272 P. 290 (Cal. 
1928) and Christenson vs. Ohrman, 156 P. 2d 848 
(Kan.). No authority is cited to the contrary. 
It is recognized that generally, ambiguitie'S in 
a written contract may be explained by parol testi-
mony, but it is not every uncertainty or difference 
of opinion as to the interpretation of 'a given phrase, 
which gives rise to such an ambiguity as to make 
a written instrument enforceable. Where such a 
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rule sanctioned, a party to a w.ritten instrument 
could, by placing a strained construction upon what 
would otherwise be reasonably clear l~nguage, give 
himself the . opportunity to introduce parol testi-
money to defeat the very purpose of the written in-
strum,ent. Pulsipher vs. Tolboe, 373 P. 2d 360 (filed 
Utah, April2, 1962). 
In the pre~ent case, the court found that the 
language contained in Paragraph 8 of the lease, 
"a further period beginning as of the termination 
date of this lease" was so ambiguous and cast such 
uncertainty into the instrument as to make the en-
tire paragraph unenforceable (R. 2). It appears 
that were it not for the use of the langu1age 
cited, defendant would have a right to renew the 
lease for ·a ten year period, similar to that of the 
first term. 'There is no uncertainty as to the period 
of the lease. Further, a careful reading of the en-
tire paragraph makes cle'ar any supposed uncertainty 
which exists by reason of the phrase. The word 
''renewal", or its equivalent "new lease", is referred 
to three times in the paragraph. A condition is 
.stated in the same paragraph "that he (lessee) shall 
sign or offer to sign a new lease upon the sa~e tetms 
,{Lnd conditions as herein contained" (Emphasis 
;;tdded). There is nq uncertainty. about the condi-
tions of the lease, and there is no uncertainty as to 
the '"term''· of the initial lease. 
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The law in this regard is certain enough to 
permit the writer in 32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Ten-
ant, Section '58, P. 807, to state: 
"A general covenant to 'renew' implies a re-
newal on the same terms and for the same 
time as the initial lease, and is, therefore, 
sufficiently certain to be enforceable." 
Similarly, in the Colorado case of Yoman vs. 
Levine, 206 P. 2d 596 (Colo. 1949), the court in 
holding that one partner was not liable to the other 
in a dissolution contract which referred to the re-
newal of a lease, stated: 
"A general covenant to extend or renew im-
plies 'an additional term equal to the first, 
and upon the same terms including that of 
rent.'' 
This general statement of law is supported by 
numerous authority. Also, in 51 C.J.S. Landlord 
and Tenant, Section 71, at Page 619, the following 
language appears : 
"In the absence of 'an agreement to the con-
trary, a covenant to extend or renew ordin-
arily imports a holding on the same terms as 
the original lease. 
" ... In the absence of a provision specifying 
the duration of a new term, a covenant to 
renew or extend implies an 'additional term 
for the same term as the original lease" (Em-
phasis added) . 
In the present case, the renewal paragraph con-
tains a general covenant to renew. Plaintiff does 
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not dispute this. Uncertainty, if any there be, by 
reason of the phrase "for 'a further period" is eli-
minated by application of the principles of legal 
construction. Particularly, is this true when the in-
strument is construed against the landlord and in 
favor of the tenant. An attempt to make it uncertain 
is not a reasonable construction and runs contrary 
to the ~admitted intention of the parties to renew 
the lease as expressed in the plain language of the 
contract. 
Mr. Russell, the lessor, knew of the }anguage 
in the lease, and read it before signing. (T. 26). 
Were he not satisfied with the plain intent expressed 
in Paragraph 8, he was in a position to have it 
changed, or refuse to sign the lease. Knowing of the 
language, and being satisfied with it, he signed the 
le~ase and granted the lessee the privileges clearly 
~stated. 
It is submitted that when an ordinary meaning, 
common sense construction is given to the language 
in question, it is made clear and unambiguous. 
"The lexicographers generally give 'period' 
as a synonym of 'term' ... Black's Law Dic-
tionary states: 'Term' signifies the bounds, 
limitation or extension of time by which an 
estate is granted as when a man holds an 
estate for any limited or specific number of 
years, ... " Martinez vs. Rocky Mountain & 
S. F. Ry. Co., 47 P. '2d 903, 905 (N.M.). 
See also: Ex rel John Jay Healey vs. Leask, 
67 N.Y. 529 (N.Y.). 
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Webster's N e1v International Dictionary, Un-
abridged, Second Edition, defines 'period' as 
"a division of time, series of years, months or 
days in which something is completed ... " 
The only "period", "term" or '·'division" of 
time referred to in the lease is a 10 year period. A 
renewal of the lease "period" could only refer to 
an extension of the lease for another 10 year term. 
The term "further" means additional. Thomp-
son vs. Southern Railroad Company, 116 Fed. 890 
(U.S.D.C. Ala). The san1e definition is contained in 
Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridg-
ed, Second Edition. In Raynolds vs. Browning, King 
and Cornpany, 205 N. Y.S. 7 48 (N.Y.), the court 
held the use of the word "further" in a lease meant 
"a continuation or renewal of the original period." 
Thus, the language convained in the lease, " ... 
said lessee shall have the right to renew this lease 
for a further period beginning as of the termina-
tion of this lease", is rendered clear and unambig-
uous. The words "to renew" mean "to begin again", 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Second Edi-
tion, ·and "for a further period", clearly indicates 
an additional term equivalent to the only period 
mentioned in the lease; namely, ten years. Thus, the 
provision clearly provided an extension of the lease 
for an additional period of ten years to begin upon 
termination of the original lease. 
The words "right to renew this lease" are not 
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ambiguous, nor do they have any other meaning 
than that the lessee, upon meeting the conditions 
of the lease, should have the lease renewed. By all 
definitions the word "further" means "additional", 
and by the rule of construction of legal documents 
"a further period" would mean for an additional 
period of time. That period of time, in relation to 
renewal, could only mean the same number or series 
of years; that is ten years, as set forth in the lease. 
In addition to the foregoing, -cases construing 
similar language contained in other leases, indicate 
that the phrase as used in the present lease should 
be upheld as unambiguous and the renewal pro-
vision of the lease enforced. 
The case of Starr vs. Holck, 28 N.W. 2d 289 
(Mich., 1947), is typical of the cases considering 
this problem. A provision was contained in that 
lease as follows: 
"4. At the expiration of this lease, if said 
second party shall have made all payments 
therein specified and compiled with all its 
terms in time and manner as therein· set 
forth, he or they shall be entitled to an ex-
tension thereof for ________ years on the same 
terms as therein set forth, and the covenants 
of this lease shall apply to all extensions 
thereof, and the extensions be treated as if 
a part of the original term.'' 
The court in. observing the firmly established 
principle that "ambig~ous provisions in. a lease ... 
10 
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must be construed against the lessor" held that: 
"The provisions of the lease with reference 
to the privilege of extension on the part of the 
lessees may not be ignored because of the fail-
ure of the parties to fill out the blank. Such 
failure may well be regarded as indicating 
that the lessors either did not care to specify 
a definite term for the extension or did not 
think it necessary to do so . . . " 
The court found that it constituted an exten-
sion for at least one year. 
In the case of Metcalf Auto Company vs. Nor-
ton, 109 A. 384, (Me., 1920), the defendant leased 
the property to the plaintiff for five years. The 
lease contained the following provision: 
"With the privilege on the part of the lessee 
to release at the end of said term for a term 
of years to be agreed upon at the same rental 
... " (Emphasis added) . 
Against a claim by the defendant that the 
renewal term was indefinite because the phrase, 
"a term of years to be agreed upon" me~ans no more 
than "a term to be agreed upon", the court stated: 
" ... If the language of a contract is reason-
ably susceptible to two constructions, the in-
terpretation should ordinarily be ~adopted 
which gives the words some meaning, other 
than another which leaves them meaningless." 
The court held that the language meant an 
extension of two years and as much longer as the 
parties might agree. 
11 
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In the case of Miller vs. Clemons, 276 S.W. 
2d 650, 651, (Ky. 19'55), the construction of a re-
newal provision of a five ye'ar lease was before 
the court. The provision in question stated: 
"This lease covers a period of five years from 
date, with a privilege of renewing it at the 
expiration for additional years at the same 
price." (Emphasis added). 
The lessee timely notified the lessor of his in-
tention to renew the lease "for a five year period". 
The lessor refused to extend the lease and suit 
followed. The trial court held that the lessee was 
entitled to an extension of two years. The Supreme 
Court in rejecting this restricted construction stated: 
''We think the trial court erred in limiting 
the renewal period to two years. Clemons 
was given the privilege of renewing the lease 
at its expiration 'for additional years at the 
same price'. It was the trial court's view 
that 'additional years' meant 'more than one 
ye'ar, or at least two years'. 
"In 32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant, Sec-
tion 958, H is said that a general covenant to 
'renew' implies a renewal on the same terms 
and for the same time as the original lease 
and is sufficiently certain to be enforceable. 
We think the renewal provision under con-
sideration has the essential characteristics of 
a general covenant. In addirtion to authorizing 
a renewal it referred to additional years at 
the same price. It is our view that the ex-
pression 'additional years at the same price' 
related back to the original period of the 
12 
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lease, namely, five years." (Emphasis added) 
See also Cunningham vs. Pattee, 99 Mass. 248. 
Our own court in the case of Cummings vs. 
Rytting, 116 Utah 1, 207 P. 2d 804, had before it 
the problem of construing a renewal provision of 
a lease whi'ch provided: 
"To have and to hold the said premises, to-
gether with the appurtenances, unto the said 
lessee, his executors, administrators and as-
signs, from the 15th day of April, A.D., 1940, 
for and during and until the 15th day of 
April, A.D., 194'5, a term of five years. With 
a five year option." 
It was claimed th'at the phrase "with a five year 
option was so indefinite and ambiguous as to 'be 
meaningless. 
The Supreme Court rejected this contention as 
having no merit. The court found that the context 
of the provision clearly indicated that it was the 
intent of the lessor to grant an option to the lessee 
to have and to hold for an additional term of five 
years. In this connection the court stated: 
"Where the covenant for ~a renewal i1s general 
and does not state the 1term of the renewal 
lease, then the lease is to be upon the same 
general terms and conditions as the old lease, 
which are to be applicable to the renewal 
period.'' (citing cases) 
It is submitted that the renewal provision of 
the present l~ase is not ambiguous and states with 
13 
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sufficient clarity the intention of the lessor to grant 
an option to renew the lease. The words "for a fur-
ther period", when read in context, rather than make 
the lease ambiguous or indefinite, serve to clarify 
the term of the renewal by referring to the only lease 
period mentioned in the instrument. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PAROL 
TESTI1MONY TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET THE 
TERMS OF THE WRrTTEN LE~SE. 
Over the objection of the defendant's attorney, 
the plaintiff 'and the plaintiff''s witnesses were per-
mitted to testify concerning conversations which 
pre-dated the signing of the lease (T. 9, 24). Mr. 
Duane E. Fuller, the Secretary of the Self-Service 
Enterprises, Inc., the in'itial lessee (defendant's as-
signor) testified that after negotiations with the 
plaintiff he "drew up the rough draft of the lease" 
and then presented it to their attorney, Mr. C. N. 
Ottosen in Salt Lake City for final preparation 
( T. 4) . This testimony is contrary to the finding 
made by the court that Mr. Fuller ''after consulta-
tion with its attorney" prepared and drew the lease 
( R. 21). The court made the following Finding: 
"'The court further finds that prior to the 
signing of said lease, Duane E. Fuller, Sec-
retary of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., nego-
tiated with the plaintiff for said lease and 
held meetings and conversations with the 
plain tiff concerning said lease and the term 
14 
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of said proposed lease, during such meetings 
and conversations, Duane E. Fuller, in be-
half of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., request-
ed that the plain tiff grant to Self -Service 
Enterprises, Inc., an option of renewal of said 
lease for an :;tddi tional ten year period beyond 
June 1, 1960, but the plaintiff refused to en-
ter into a lease to g:rant the Self-Service En-
terprises, Inc., a right or option to renew or 
extend the lease beyond the ten ye'ar period, 
beginning with June 1, 1960, and that in the 
wording of Paragraph 8 thereof, it was not 
intended, by the parties to the lease, thereby 
to grant Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., a right 
of renewal of said lease for 'a period of ten 
years, beginning June 1, 1960, and that both 
the Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., and the 
plaintiff so conls,trued said lease at the execu-
tion thereof." (R. 21) 
The testimony upoh wnich this Finding of Fact 
is allegedly based was objected to specifically by the 
defendant's attorney in this language: 
''May I for the record have one more objec-
tion. I object to any and 'all of these conver-
sations on the ground and for the reason that 
all negotiations and all conversations and 'all 
dealings have been merged in the . written 
instrument, and any testimony as to what 
their negotiations and conversations were be-
fore it had been merged in the written instru-
ment are un'admissible to show any other 
agreement because they are in the written 
instrument." (T. 9) '. ~ . 
A similar objection was made· by the defend-
ant's a_ttorney when ~he plaintiff \vas wsked con-
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cerning his interpretation of the instrument and 
discussions and testimony concerning conversations 
held prior to the time the instrument was executed 
(T. 24). The testimony was admitted conditionally 
(T. 24), and was later admitted by the court with-
out restriction. 
The law is well settled in Utah that preliminary 
negotiations are merged in a written instrument, 
and the instrument itself is to be looked to in deter-
mining the intention of the parties. Typical of the 
many cases announcing and reaffirming this rule 
is Ephriam Theatre Company vs. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 
163, 321 P. 2d 221. Justice Crockett writing for a 
unanimous court states: 
''In considering the controversy here, it is well 
to keep in mind the fundamental concepts in 
regard to con tracts : That their purpose is to 
reduce to writing the conditions upon which 
the minds of the parties have met and to fix 
their rights and duties in respect thereto ... 
Unless there is 'ambiguity or uncertainty in 
the language so that the meaning is confused, 
or is susceptible to more than one meaning, 
there is no justification for interpretation 
or explanation from extraneous forces. It 
would defeat the very purpose of formal con-
tracts to permit a party to invoke the use of 
words or conduct incon'sistent with its terms 
to prove that the parties did not mean what 
they said, or to use such inconsistent words 
or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or am-
biguity where none would otherwise exist. 
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor 
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the court has any right to null or modify the 
conditions which are purely expressed merely 
because it may subject one of the parties to 
hardship but there must be enforced 'in ac-
cordance with the intention as ... m1anifested 
by the language used by the parties to the 
contract'.'' 
The court relied upon the following decisions: 
Murphy vs. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 29'5, 236 P. 
680, 683. See also Richlands Irrigation Company vs. 
Westview Irrigation Company, 96 Utah 403, 80 P. 
2d 458; Paggii vs. Skliris, 54 Utah 88, 1'79 P. 739; 
Johnson vs. Geddes, 49 Utah '137, 161 P. 910. 
Probably the most recent pronouncement of the 
law in this respect is contained in the case of Puls-
phier vs. Tolboe, 373 P. 2d 390 (filed April2, 1962). 
There the court rejected an attempt to explain the 
terms of a written contract by parol testimony and 
sa:ted: 
"Inasmuch as the language is clear and un-
ambiguous there is no basis for 'interpreting 
it' by showing what the intent or the 'under-
standing' of the defendant was by extraneous 
evidence." 
The Utah court has frequently considered this 
proposition and has consistently followed the prin-
ciple announced in the Ephriam Theatre case. ·Typic-
al of more recent cases considering the same ques-
tion is Jensen's Used Cars vs. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 
323 P. 2d 259. In afffrming the trial court which 
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refused to permit the defendant to orally explain a 
written instrument, it stated: 
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts 
we seek to determine the intentions of the 
parties, but it is also elementary and of ex-
treme practical importance that we hold con-
tracting parties to their .fair and understand-
able language deliberately committed to writ-
ing and endorsed by them as signa tors thereto. 
Were this not so business, one with another 
among our citizens, would be relegated to 
the chaotic, and the basic purpose of the law 
to 'supply enforceable rules of conduct for the 
maintenance and improvement of an orderly 
society's welfare and providence would find 
itself impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold 
one responsible for language which he himself 
expouses. Such language is the only imple-
ment he gives us to fashion a determir~;ation 
as to the intentions of the parties. Under such 
circumstances he should not be required to 
embosom any request that we ignore that fair 
!language. This is as it should be. The rule 
excluding matters ot~tside the four corners of 
a clear, understandable document is a fai1· 
one, and one's contentions concerning this in-
tent should extend no further than his own 
clear expressions.'' (Emphasis added) 
Again in Mathias vs. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 
261 P. 2d 952, the following language appears: 
"In searching for the meaning the Court must 
first examine the language used in the in-
strument itself and accord to it the weight 
and effect which the instrument itself may 
show that the parties intend the words to 
have. If then its meaning is s~till ambiguous or 
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uncertain, the court may consider .other con-
temporaneous writings concerning the, same 
subject matter, and may, if it is still uncer-
tain, consider parol evidence of the parties 
intention." (Emphasis added) 
In Continental Bank and Trust Company vs. 
Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773, the court 
emphasized that the intent of the:. parties was 
to be ascertained first from the four corners of the 
instrument. Parol testimony is not to be received 
concerning the intention of the parties where any 
ambiguity or uncertainty can be reconciled from a 
reasonable interpretation of the inS'trument itself. 
The case of Wilson vs. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 
348 P. 2d 9131, contains another statement by this 
court indfca ting that the parol evidence rule pre-
cludes oral testimony concerning the events which 
precede or accompany the execution of 'a written 
instrument : 
"In considering a written instrument it is a 
judicial function to interpret a written con-
tract which is free from ambiguity 'and does 
not require oral testimony to determine its 
meaning. Ambiguity in a written instrument 
does not appear until the application of per-
tinent rules of interpretation to the face of 
the instrument leaves it generally uncertain 
which one of two or more meanings is the 
proper meaning." Oliver vs. Nugen,,. 308 P. 
2d 13'2, (Kan.1937). 
It is submitted in_the instant case that when 
. . ' ~ . . ·- : • ''·I 
the applicable rules o£ construction~-are applied to 
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the language in Paragraph 8 of the lease, that any 
ambiguity which may exist is eliminated, and the 
instrument is made certain and enforceable. 
To give any credence to the stated intended 
meaning by Mr. Fuller and Mr. Russell, the clear 
language of the paragraph granting a renewal must 
be completely ignored. It's position is now even 
more incredible when con'Sidered in light of Mr. 
Russell's testimony, which is as follows: 
"Q. And at the time that the lease was sign-
ed, was there a conversation - any conver-
sation - that went on then? 
"A. Well, I think no more than I've ex-
plained, other than they said they were happy 
to make the lease and it was ~a friendly deal, 
and just along that line. Everything was com-
pleted and they could go forward. 
"Q. Was there any discussion between you 
and them concerning the wording of the lease, 
of paragraph 8, concerning the words, 'a fur-
ther period'? 
"A. No, sir. No, sir. It was just 'a ten-year 
lease. That was it. 
"Q. Well, a ten-year lease, yes. I'm talking 
now about a further period. 
* * * 
"Q. From the lease itself - you're familiar 
with the lease? 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. In the lease it says it should be renewed 
for a further period? 
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"A. Yes. I knew it was there." (T. 25, 26) 
Mr. Fuller testified that the language "to re-
new this lease for a further period" was inserted 
''hoping that Mr. Russell would .go along with it'' 
(T. 12). The following exerpt from his testimony 
is pertinent : 
"A. We inserted that in that paragraph hop-
ing that Mr. Russell would go along with it. 
"Q. And would sign the lease with that in it? 
"A. You bet. 
''Q. And it was signed with that in? 
"A. You bet. 
"Q. In other words, you wanted to go in to 
this le'ase. You wanted to have an option to 
renew or to sign another lease after ten years? 
"A. You bet." (T. 12). 
Even if the clause were ·considered ambiguous, 
the plain intention of the lessee was to obtain an 
option for renewal for an additional ten year period. 
The lessor, Mr. Russell, signed the lease well aware 
of the l'anguage providing for it. Since the instru-
ment is to be construed against the landlord in ac-
cordance with the principles previously announced, 
the court committed error in refusing to enforce the 
option for renewal. 
The testimony which was improperly admitted 
by the trial court in permitting the plaintiff and 
Mr. Fuller to "explain" what was intended by the 
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language contained in the lease, did not lend clarity 
to the instrument but only served to confuse its 
clear meaning. 
The Washington court in the case of W asking-
ton Fish and Oyster Company vs. G. B. Halferty 
and Company, 269 P. 2d 806 (Wash. 1954), dealt 
with a very similar question. The court rejected 
oral explranations of the type permitted in this case 
because they were opinions which were "mere legal 
conclusions and carry no weight". However, such 
testimony is objectionable for an even more funda-
mental reason. The court quoted with approval from 
the earlier case of Van Doren Roofing and Cornice 
Company vs. Guardian Casualty and Guaranty Com-
pany, 99 Wash. 68, 168 P. 1124, 1129: 
"The rule is universal that the written con-
tract itself must be resorted to as the source 
of authority for receiving parol evidence. 
Parol evidence is never admissible to create 
an ambiguity, but only to explain or remove 
an ambiguity apparent on the face of the in-
strument, or to identify a subject-rootter 
otherwise uncertain (Emphasis added) 
See also Scahwieger vs. Harry W. Robins and Com-
pany, 290, P. 2d 984 (Wash. 195S). 
Since the court considers certain that which 
can be made certain DeLong vs. Starkey, 92 N.E. 2d 
2'28 ( In'd.), the lranguage contained in Paragraph 
8 of the lease cannot be considered ambiguous, if 
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through the use of a common sense interpretation 
and the application of rules of construction, it can 
be given meaning. 
It is submited th'at the language contained in 
Paragraph 8 of the lease on its f'ace is clear and 
certain in meaning. It is not surprising that Mr. 
Russell, ten years following the execution of the 
original lease and after Mr. Valentine invested 
$35,000.00 in capital improvements on what was 
previously farm ground ( T. 59) , should have second 
thoughts concerning the lease and now assert that 
he did not intend to give an option to renew it. 
Aside from the parol evidence rule which precludes 
him from testifying as to the intended meaning of 
a signed lease, it is so self -serving in view of the 
"windfall" which would result that his testimony 
bears no credence whatever. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant and ~appellant respectfully con-
tends that Paragraph 8 of the lease relating to the 
renewal, is by all rules of legal construction, and by 
the terms of the lease itself, clear, unambiguous and 
definite. It means, as clearly expressed by the ordin-
ary use of the English language, that the lessee 
should have the right to renew the lease for a fur-
ther or additional period, which is the same as the 
term of the original lease ; that is, ten years. The 
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appeUant respectfully requests that the Judgment 
of the District Court in and for Weber County be 
reversed and the case remanded to the District Court 
with directions for that court to enter a finding 
that the renewal provision of the lease is unambig-
uous and the lessee had the option and the right to 
renew the same for a period of ten years beginning 
at the termin'ation of the period of time of the 
original lease, and make a finding that the lessee 
exercised the option to renew, in accordance with 
the terms and provisions of the lease for an addi-
tional ten years, and that appellant, Grant L. Valen-
tine, is entitled to the possession and occupancy 
of the property under terms and conditions of the 
said lease. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON AND BALDWIN AND 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendnnt 
and Appellant 
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